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Abstract This paper highlights the complexity and
challenges of providing reliable services in the evolv-
ing communications infrastructure. The hurdles in pro-
viding end-to-end availability guarantees are discussed
and research problems identified. Avenues for overcom-
ing some of the challenges examined are presented. This
includes the use of a highly available network spine em-
bedded in a physical network together with efficient
crosslayer mapping to offer survivability and differen-
tiation of traffic into classes of resilience.
Keywords Survivable Networks · Multi-Class Re-
silience · High Availability
1 Introduction
Communication networks are one of the critical na-
tional infrastructures upon which society depends [8,
15, 20]. The USA government categorizes communica-
tion networks as one of the most important critical in-
frastructures, since many other critical infrastructures
(e.g., financial/banking, transportation, emergency ser-
vices, etc.) depend on communication networks in order
to function [9, 20]. This cross infrastructure dependency
on communication networks has led to concern about
the reliability and resilience of the current infrastruc-
ture by a number of USA government agencies (e.g.,
DoE, FCC, DHS) [9, 40] and the research community
in general. Hence it is imperative that communication
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networks be designed to adequately respond to failures
and attacks.
A communication network failure is usually defined
as a situation where the network is unable to deliver
communication services. Thus a failure can be viewed
as a disruption of service rather than degradation due
to congestion. Typical failure events include cable cuts,
hardware malfunctions, software errors, power outages,
natural disasters (e.g., flood, fire, earthquake, etc.), ac-
cidents, human errors (e.g., incorrect maintenance) and
malicious physical/electronic attacks. As society becomes
more dependent on networks, the consequences of net-
work failures increase and the need to make the network
resilient to failures grows as well. This has led to inter-
est in the design of resilient networks, which are able to
survive failures.
Survivability techniques for improving network re-
silience can be classified into three categories: 1) preven-
tion, 2) network design, and 3) traffic management and
restoration. Prevention or avoidance techniques focus
primarily on improving component and system reliabil-
ity and security in order to reduce the occurrence of
faults. Some examples are the use of physical security
measures where equipment is housed and provisioning
backup power supplies for network equipment. Network
design techniques try to mitigate the effects of system
level failures such as link or node failures by placing suf-
ficient diversity and redundancy in the network topol-
ogy. An example is the use of multi-homing nodes so
that a single link failure cannot isolate a network node
or an access network. Traffic management and restora-
tion procedures seek to direct the network load such
that a failure has minimum impact when it occurs and
that connections affected by a failure are reconnected
around the failure. The use of pre-configured backup
LSP paths in MPLS networks is a widely used exam-
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ple of traffic mangement and restoration. The combined
goal of the three categories of survivability techniques
is to make a network failure imperceptible to network
users by providing service continuity and by minimizing
congestion in the network. This may be accomplished
by designing network infrastructures that are robust
to malfunctions of nodes and links, and implementing
network protocols and control systems that are inher-
ently fault-tolerant and self-healing. However, cost and
complexity are always an issue. The key challenge is to
provide the required availability at a minimum cost and
in the simplest fashion.
At first glance one would assume that providing re-
silience in communication networks would be easy in
comparison to other fields that require high levels of
availability. For example, in the aerospace/satellite in-
dustry high levels of availability are required in the
face of several hurdles, such as: an adverse operating
environment (i.e., radiation, temperature, vibration),
weight limitations, physical space constraints, electrical
power constraints and in most cases no chance for phys-
ical repair of failed components [27, 35]. Given these
constraints satellite systems are designed to maximize
the mean time to failure and extensive use is made of
structural importance measures in determining where
and how redundancy should be added to systems. The
end result is often partial or full redundancy used only
in the components, which are crucial from a system
wide perspective for mission critical services [27].
In contrast in the communication network field, one
can argue it is easy to reach availability requirements
by utilizing standard redundancy techniques such as
adding additional communications links, nodes, restora-
tion techniques (e.g., preconfigured back up path with
preserved resources) and services until the availability
goals are met. However in this paper we show such an
assumption is naive and the problem is far from sim-
ple with many challenges. Here, we discuss some of the
challenges and open research problems and point out
possible directions for future work. The remainder of
this paper is organized as follows. Section 2, presents
a sample network architecture and discusses the trends
and issues in providing resilience. Next in Section 3, we
sketch out potential solutions to some of the challenges
identified. Finally, Section 4 summarizes the paper.
2 Trends and Issues in Resilience
We begin the discussion by briefly examining a sample
network architecture. The goal is to provide an overview
and context that can be referred to in explaining the
challenges and framing potential solutions.
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Fig. 1 Example Network Architecture
2.1 Network Structure
The current communications infrastructure consists of
a set of interconnected networks which can be catego-
rized based on their geographic size and function as
either access networks (ANs), metropolitan area net-
works (MANs), or wide area networks (WANs) as shown
in Figure 1. Access networks provide the end commu-
nication path to and from the users (i.e., the so called
“last mile”). A wide variety of technologies are utilized
in access networks including; cable, twisted pair, DSL,
fiber to the home or office, fiber to the curb, power
line communications, cellular networks, wireless LANs,
WiMAX, and satellites. Access networks typically have
a tree or hub and spoke type of topology with little or
no redundancy provided due to cost constraints, though
customers willing to pay for extra services (generally
medium to large commercial customers) can be pro-
vided with dual-homed premises (i.e., two diverse links
to different points on a MAN). Metropolitan area net-
works provide a local backbone network spanning a city
or metro area. MANs typically have some fault toler-
ance with rings or mesh topologies used. Technologies
used in MANs include WDM optical fiber, SONET,
Ethernet, WiMAX, etc. WANs also known as core back-
bone or long haul networks, are the most uniform tech-
nology with almost all WANs now using optical commu-
nication links with WDM or DWDM technology. Fur-
thermore, WANs are usually designed in a mesh topol-
ogy with some level of fault tolerance (e.g., any sin-
gle link failure) pre-planned. Given this infrastructure
an end-to-end connection for a user/service/application
would typically span several component networks (e.g.,
one AN, one MAN, one or more WANs, and then an-
other MAN and AN). Note that, the component net-
works (ANs, MANs, WANs) will typically be owned
and operated by multiple organizations (e.g., service
providers).
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The component networks (ANs, MANs, and WANs)
in the communications infrastructure are multi-layer in
nature, accommodating a wide variety of users and ap-
plications. Broadly speaking, each network consist of
a top layer where services such as, voice, video, data,
broadcast video, are provided. These services are pro-
vided over a middle or switched layer (e.g., MPLS la-
bel switching). Lastly, the middle layer is provided over
a physical transport layer technology such as DWDM
light paths on optical fibers. Note that, these layers may
contain several sub-layers (e.g., SONET over DWDM
over physical duct layer) depending on the level of de-
tail one includes. For example, in a recent paper a group
from AT&T [46] pointed out five distinct sub-layers
could be identified in AT&T’s DWDM transport back-
bone.
Here as a vehicle for discussion we consider a three-
layer core backbone network, which could be composed
of OVERLAY, IP, and WDM network layers as shown
in Figure 2. In this architecture, overlay nodes are at-
tached to an IP router. IP routers are associated with
an optical WDM switch; the switches are then intercon-
nected by multi-wavelength fibers capable of carrying a
number of transmission channels. In the lower two net-
work layers, IP and WDM, each IP route is established
by one lightpath or more that spans across fibers and
occupies one wavelength in each fiber. Overlays pro-
vide a top layer for the network that can take a role of
processing and passing data between end-systems [2, 7].
In particular overlay networks can support applications
when traffic runs across multiple Internet domains [38].
Recently, several commercial virtual network operators
(VNOs) (e.g., [1, 44] ) have constructed service overlay
networks.
2.2 Basic Resilient Design Concepts
Resilient network research originated with telecommu-
nications network operators and has been a subject of
study for decades. However in recent years there has
been increasing interest in network resilience and sur-
vivability with journals dedicating special issues to the
resilience of networks and components, specialized fo-
cused conferences being held (e.g., Reliable Network
Design and Modeling (RNDM), Design of Reliable Com-
munication Networks (DRCN)) and several excellent
books published [26, 33, 42]. The current literature tends
to focus on providing survivability in a particular tech-
nology at a specific layer (i.e., application overlay layer
[21, 36] switched layer (IP [18], MPLS [4]), physical
transport layer [25]) in a piece of the network archi-
tecture (e.g., MAN or WAN). For example, developing
techniques for implementation of lightpath restoration
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Fig. 2 Multi-layer network structure
in core DWDM optical backbone sections of the In-
ternet (e.g., a Tier 1 ISP network) [25] or survivable
SONET Ring techniques to overcome link failures in
MANs. A survey of resilient network design techniques
is given in [16]. While the implementation of surviv-
ability in a particular technology or protocol in a com-
ponent network involves many details particular to the
application, the basic techniques and principles used
are largely the same in each case.
While a variety of survivability techniques (e.g., mul-
tiple homing, trunk diversity, self-healing rings, pre-
planned backup routes, p-cycles, etc.) have been pro-
posed for a range of network technologies, they all work
on the concept of redundancy and diversity. Consider
a mesh network where traffic is routed on fixed end-
to-end paths (e.g., lightpaths in a WDM network). An
active path (AP) (sometimes called the working path)
is the route taken by the traffic under normal operating
conditions. For the network to be survivable to failures
in the active path, one must be able to find a suit-
able backup path (BP) (i.e., an alternate path around
the failure) in the topology. Obviously, the backup path
and the active path must be physically diverse or dis-
joint so that both paths are not lost at the same time.
How the active and backup paths are diverse can be
defined in several ways. For example, they may be link
disjoint as shown in Figure 3(a) or node disjoint which
is shown in Figure 3(b). One can see in the figure that
the link disjoint BP can potentially recover from any
link failure in the AP, whereas the node disjoint BP
can potentially recover from any link or relay node fail-
ure in the AP. Note that, for diverse AP and BP paths
to exist, the physical network topology must be a ring
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Fig. 3 Resilient network concepts
or a mesh structure with at least two disjoint end-to-
end paths from every source-destination pair. However,
even though a BP may exist for an AP there must be
enough spare resources on the BP to carry the AP traf-
fic at the required QoS level. This requires the alloca-
tion of redundant resources on the BP, which are typ-
ically not used except in the case of failure. The focus
of resilient network design is to plan the allocation of
diversity and redundancy in the network to support re-
silience to a set of failure scenarios (e.g., any single link
failure). In order to take advantage of the redundancy
and diversity in the network, appropriate fault man-
agement and traffic restoration procedures must be in
place. Hence, given a specific traffic restoration scheme
(e.g., p-cycles), in the current literature the resilient
network design problem is to determine the network
topology or virtual topology to survive a set of failure
scenarios. Survivable network design, typically makes
use of graph theoretic or optimization-based problem
formulations with heuristic or meta heuristic solution
algorithms used to provide scalability [14, 16, 33].
2.3 Issues and Trends
Given the overall infrastructure network architecture
of Figure 1 and a typical multi-layer network structure
like Figure 2, a number of trends and issues that affect
resilience can be identified as discussed below.
Cost is the major factor affecting the amount of re-
dundancy and fault tolerant mechanisms that can be
implemented in a network. As communication network-
ing is increasingly becoming a commodity type of busi-
ness the cost constraints in improving network avail-
ability are more severe. Furthermore, only a small frac-
tion of users are willing to pay extra for high levels
of availability. The resulting cost limitations directly
affect network resilience by limiting the amount of re-
dundancy that an operator can afford to add to the
network infrastructure. For example, cost may limit fac-
tors such as the connectivity of the network topology,
the quality and reliability of the equipment/software
used in the network, the number of sites that can em-
ploy backup battery supplies, etc. Cost limits also im-
pose constraints on the network operations staff, both
the size of the staff used to maintain and operate the
network and the amount of training for the staff. This
is particularly important as several studies have shown
that human error is responsible for between 33-55% of
network failures.
As noted above, the network infrastructure in com-
posed of component networks, which are multi-layer in
nature. Virtualization and the deployment of virtual
private networks (VPNs) is possible at the various lay-
ers in the component networks (e.g., lightpath based
VPNs in WDM, MPLS LSPs based VPNs, etc.) Vir-
tualization is a well-established trend with virtual pri-
vate networks being deployed within a network (e.g.,
VPLS within a MAN, IP/MPLS within a WAN), across
multiple networks, and end-to-end at the application
layer. Virtualization is appealing to customers in pro-
viding logical segregation of traffic, improved security
and support for traffic engineering and QoS. However
for network service providers the complexity of manag-
ing thousands of VPNs increases the likelihood of hu-
man errors and cross-layer traffic engineering and fault
tolerance provisioning is increasingly difficult. This is
especially true given that traffic demand occurs at each
layer in the network. Furthermore, interdomain issues
such as peering and domain boundaries can occur at
multiple layers. Additionally, the nature of the traffic
itself is changing with recent studies showing that video
is now the dominant traffic type in WANs. This is ex-
acerbated by the move towards information or content
centric networking where most of the traffic is connect-
ing customers to content rather than customers to cus-
tomers. This shift to content networking has resulted in
the deployment of overlay networks by content delivery
network operators and the fielding of optical layer un-
derlay networks by large content providers. Currently
the traffic dynamics largely differs with the layer, as the
lower layers show significant changes on a slower time
scale then higher layers. However, the networking as a
service (NAAS) concept where high bandwidth light-
paths can be provided on demand will add dynamic
Layer 1 traffic on a faster time scale in the future. Thus,
there is a potential for dynamic overlay and underlay
virtual networks
In general multiple layers present a number of sur-
vivability problems. Here we illustrate the problems by
considering the sample network given in Fig. 2. In the
figure, the OVERLAY, IP, and WDM networks consist
of 3 nodes, 3 links, 4 nodes, 6 links, and 5 nodes, 7
links, respectively. The numbers on each link indicate
the link index. Let Hji : L(j) 7→ L(i) be a link incidence
matrix or cross-layer mapping matrix showing the map-
ping of Layer j onto Layer i where each j-th layer link
is assigned to a subset of i-th layer links. When put in
matrix form, the cross-layer mapping has rows corre-
sponding to layer j links whereas columns correspond
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to layer i links. The layers are numbered in ascend-
ing order with Layer 1 corresponding to the physical
WDM transport layer. For example, the OVERLAY to
IP cross-layer mapping H32 could be given by
H32 =

1 2 3 4 5 6
1 0 0 0 1 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 1 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 1

which is the most obvious mapping as each link in the
OVERLAY network uses only one link in the IP net-
work. However, if the IP to WDM cross-layer mapping
H21 is given by
H21 =

1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
5 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 1 0

then one can see that links 5 and 4 in the IP layer have
link 3 in the WDM layer in common. Thus the failure
of link 3 at the WDM layer will result in two links (4
and 5) failing at the IP layer, which in turn results
in two links (1 and 2) failing at the OVERLAY layer
resulting in a disconnected overlay network. The cross-
layer mappings given by H32 and H
2
1 are illustrated in
Figure 4, where the lower layer links implementing high
layer virtual links are marked with the same colors. For
example, link 2 in the OVERLAY layer is colored blue
as is it’s mapping on to links 5 in the IP layer and links
3 and 5 in the WDM layer.
This effect of a single lower layer failure resulting in
multiple failures at the layer above and in turn higher
layers is called fault propagation. A major cause of fault
propagation is poor cross-layer link mapping. In [24]
the authors reveal that, in a highly-meshed operational
IP over WDM network, ill-chosen link mapping con-
tributes to 12% of all unplanned failures that affect the
IP traffic. The figure is likely to be higher in partial-
meshed IP networks as it increases the chance of net-
work partitioning or reduces the number of rerouting
choices when a backup path is needed or failures hap-
pen in the WDM layer.
An additional cause of fault propagation is shared
risk link groups (SRLGs) which are defined by a set
of links that fail together due to physical placement
of cabling in conduits/infrastructure. When a SRLG
conduit fails all of the lower layer links contained in
the conduit may fail simultaneously. Most the work on
SRLGs has focused on a single-layer or two-layer net-
work (e.g.,[13]). Obviously, to solve the fault propaga-
tion problem, higher layers will need information on the
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Fig. 4 Cross-layer Mapping with Fault Propagation
structure of the lower layers. Note, that this is especially
true for application overlay [2, 17] and virtual private
networks at layer two and above.
A second problem in multiple layer networks is ca-
pacity efficiency, since a top-layer path may require
more or less total bandwidth depending on which layer
determines the capacity allocation and routing assign-
ment and how the cross-layer mapping is accomplished.
In particular, backhaul on lower layers physical links
that are shared by virtual links in higher layers [23]
is a problem. Again, consider the sample network il-
lustrated in Figure 2 with the cross-layer mappings
given above. If we modify the cross-layer mapping of
the OVERLAY network to IP network H32 such that
link 2 in the OVERLAY layer is mapped to links 2 and
3 in the IP layer then the OVERLAY network can sur-
vive any single physical WDM layer link failure. The
resulting mapping is given by:
H32 =

1 2 3 4 5 6
1 0 0 0 1 0 0
2 0 1 1 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 1
 .
However, for OVERLAY link 2 a backhaul routing loop
occurs in Layer 1, because the IP links 2 and 3 use
WDM links 2 and 4, and 2 respectively. Thus, the WDM
link 2 is used twice. The cross-layer mappings given
by H32 and H
2
1 are illustrated in Figure 5, where the
lower layer links implementing high layer virtual links
are marked with the same colors. While this routing is
survivable, it is not resource efficient.
This backhaul problem can arise when higher layer
routes are mapped through an intermediary node in the
layer below. Therefore, a survivable link mapping alone
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Fig. 5 Cross-layer Mapping with Backhaul
is not sufficient to guarantee capacity efficiency when
backup paths using more than a single hop are con-
sidered in a multi-layer network. In general, each layer
of a network will need to employ some type of self-
healing capabilities to address faults occurring in that
layer and possibly lower layers. In such a multi-layer
scheme, coordination between layers is required to pro-
vide an efficient network design and recovery process
upon a failure. Specifically, coordination of alarms and
resilience mechanisms at the layers and prioritization
of traffic for fault recovery within and among the lay-
ers is needed. Note, that without proper coordination
of the resilience mechanisms oscillatory behavior and
instability can occur.
As mentioned previously an end-to-end connection
will typically traverse several component networks. These
component networks will typically have multiple own-
ers and operators making end-to-end availability guar-
antees hard to provide. This is due to the need for
coordination across component networks (e.g., MAN
and WAN, between two WANs, etc.), which may in-
clude harmonizing survivability techniques at various
network layers. Note, that this requires policy coor-
dination to share information (e.g., cross-layer map-
ping, fault alarms, details of restoration schemes, etc.)
among possibly competing companies. Only a small a
amount of literature exists on this topic [6, 38] with
many open problems, such as coordination of different
restoration techniques across networks and the devel-
opment of trusted third party mechanisms for the ex-
change of information.
An additional policy concern is government regula-
tions, which often specify what network operators can
and can’t do. Consider the critical infrastructure pro-
tection plans of the USA government, which focus on
the reliability, and security of critical infrastructures [9].
This can lead to cross regulation issues where the needs
of one infrastructure impose requirements on the com-
munications infrastructure. For example, in contrast to
the current power grid, the smart electrical grid requires
significantly more communications. In fact, one of the
key requirements is the use of two-way communications
between customers and the grid, which is necessary to
implement demand response techniques, balance gener-
ation with consumption and enable the integration of
distributed generation sources. The US Department of
Energy (DoE) recently put forth a set of requirements
for the communications infrastructure to support the
smart grid [40]. Table 1 lists typical values given by the
DoE, illustrating the wide range of availability require-
ments to be met. In particular, the wide area situa-
tional awareness function which is implemented by the
installation of synchrophasors at substations to closely
monitor and adaptively stabilize the power grid requires
very high levels of end-to-end availability in connecting
to regional power grid control centers. Obviously, these
availability requirements will impact feasible implemen-
tations and resilient network design choices in ANs,
MANs and WANs. In particular, the US Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC) [12] noted that the lack
of a mission-critical WAN meeting the requirements of
the Smart Grid threatens to delay its implementation
and points to this as an area for research and develop-
ment.
Another little-studied issue in the literature is the
design of networks for resilience taking into account the
variations in failure impacts and likelihood of failures.
Several, studies have observed that the rates of failure
and repair rates are geographically correlated due to a
number of factors. Examples of factors are variations in:
weather, workforce capabilities, exposure to natural dis-
asters (e.g., earthquakes, hurricanes, ice storms, etc.),
local regulations (e.g., call before dig penalties), pop-
ulation density, power supply reliability and targeted
malicious attacks [28]. The end result of these factors
is that failures often happen in a correlated fashion
with multiple near simultaneous failures. In addition,
not all failures of the same type (e.g., single link fail-
ures) have the same societal impact or magnitude. For
example, the failure of an optical fiber carrying criti-
cal supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
traffic for the electrical power grid can result in more
societal damage than a fiber carrying web traffic. De-
termining the potential societal impact of various fail-
ures would require knowledge of traffic content/service
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Table 1 Sample requirements for smart grid communications
Function Bandwidth Latency Availability
Smart Meter (AMI) 10-100 Kbps 2-15 sec 99-99.99%
Demand Response 14-100 Kbps 500 msec - several minutes 99-99.999%
Wide Area Situational Awareness 600 Kbps - 1.5 Mbps 20-200 msec 99.999-99.9999%
level agreements and how they are mapped onto phys-
ical networks.
Lastly, it is worth noting that green networking is
a rapidly emerging set of efforts by standards bodies
(e.g., ITU, TIA, ETSI, IEEE), governments, corpora-
tions, foundations and academics aimed at improving
the sustainability of ICT devices and infrastructure.
One aspect of these efforts is a focus on improving
the energy efficiency of ICT devices and their opera-
tion. This includes initiatives pushing for rapid power
up/down methods and energy efficient sleep/idle modes
for networking equipment (from access equipment to
core equipment). Furthermore, noting the diurnal na-
ture of communication network traffic, proposals for
powering down parts of a network infrastructure dur-
ing low load periods to save power and OPEX costs
have appeared in the literature [3]. This literature has
focused on saving energy without regard for the effects
on resilience, which will be longer restoration times, less
fault tolerance and lower levels of availability. The in-
teraction of resilience and green networking is an area
ripe for research.
3 Future Directions
Given the network architecture and the trends discussed
above one can see that providing end-to-end availabil-
ity guarantees for mission critical services (e.g., power
grid supervisory control and data acquisition, emer-
gency services) is a difficult challenge with many com-
plex issues to be addressed. A number of research di-
rections that have promise in meeting this challenge are
briefly discussed in the following.
3.1 Classes of Resilience and the Spine Concept
Only a small number of users and services (e.g., fi-
nancial institutions, VoIP emergency calls, power grid
wide area situational awareness) need very high levels
of availability. Furthermore, the users/services requir-
ing high levels of resilience produce only a small fraction
of the total network traffic. Also, several studies have
shown that the majority of customers are unwilling to
pay extra for high levels of availability. For example,
consumers are happy with residential Internet access if
the availability is in the range of 93 -95%, which is well
below the 99 - 99.99% range given for smart metering
at homes in Table 1.
Unfortunately, the small amount of high availability
traffic derives the network design giving rise to a free
rider scenario where the majority of customers get a
higher level of availability then they need or are willing
to pay for. Hence there is a need to support classes of re-
silience in a fashion similar to quality of service classes.
The basic concept is to categorize traffic into classes and
provide different levels of availability and fault protec-
tion for each class. The goal is to just meet availability
requirements without over-engineering. Providing qual-
ity of resilience classes has been mentioned in the cur-
rent literature [5] in a qualitative fashion or quantita-
tively examined within a single layer. The current ap-
proach to resilience service differentiation is to support
multiple classes of resilience by using different restora-
tion mechanisms per traffic type in a particular net-
work layer (e.g., WDM). For example, providing gold,
silver and bronze service classes by giving the gold traf-
fic 1+1 (node and link) disjoint path restoration, silver
class shared backup restoration and the bronze class
no protection relying on rerouting after failure. Typi-
cal simulation-based numerical results for this type of
approach [43] for a sample European network topol-
ogy show average availabilities of gold 99.89%, silver
99.73%, and bronze 97.74% classes respectively. While
this approach can provide differentiated quality of re-
silience service classes, it is not designed around end-to-
end availability guarantees. Notice that the availability
value for the gold class is too low for mission critical
services (i.e., 99.999% or higher), the spread between
gold and silver classes is small and the bronze class
availability may be higher than needed.
In order to improve the end-to-end availability to
mission critical levels across a single network (e.g., WAN)
the traditional resilient design method is increase the
network connectivity and add redundancy (e.g., more
than one backup path). This can be thought of as us-
ing many components in parallel type of design. How-
ever, such an approach would be difficult and expen-
sive to implement in an existing network. Here we pro-
pose an alternative approach based on the adoption of
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Fig. 6 Improving Parallel Component Availability
ideas from the aerospace reliability area. Given the con-
straints in mission critical aerospace systems, extensive
use is made of Birnbaum’s importance measure to guide
efforts to improve the availability [34]. Specifically, the
derivative of the system availability per component as
determined from a reliability block diagram or fault
tree analysis is used to determine where to increase
the availability. In general, one can show that for series
components the availability of the weakest component
should be improved to increase the system availability,
whereas for parallel components one should improve the
availability of the strongest component. This concept is
illustrated in Figure 6 where two communication paths
are in parallel. As shown in the table in Figure 6 for
the baseline scenario 1 the primary route has availabil-
ity 95%, the backup route 90% and the parallel combi-
nation 99.5% respectively. For scenarios 2 and 3 in the
table we increase the availability of one of the routes
by 1% (e.g., deploying a 24 hour battery backup power
supply along the route). In scenario 2, the increased
availability is applied to the backup route whereas in
scenario 3 the increased availability is applied to the
primary or working route. One can see from the ta-
ble that scenario 3 results in the largest increase in the
overall availability of the parallel configuration.
Here we apply the concept of improving the avail-
ability of the strongest component in parallel systems,
by constructing a highly available section of the network
at the physical layer. We term the high availability por-
tion of the network the network spine. The spine would
connect those nodes with traffic needing a high level
of availability and the highest quality of resilience class
traffic would be routed on the spine or use the spine as
a backup path. The nodes, link interfaces and links on
the network spine would have higher availability then
the equipment that is not part of the spine. This pro-
vides levels of availability differentiation at the physical
component level. The spine could be determined in a
number of ways such as using a capacitated minimum
spanning tree algorithm, although the spine need not
be a tree.
We illustrate the potential of the spine approach
by a simple example. In Figure 7, the top figure (a)
shows the topology of the 12-node, 18-link Polska net-
work taken from the SNDlib repository. In the base line
scenario, for the sake of simplicity we assume all links
and nodes have availability 99.9% and failure indepen-
dent backup paths are used which are node and link dis-
joint with the working path. Consider a traffic stream
between Szczecin and Katowice that needs availability
99.999%. If the working path takes the route Szczecin
- Poznan - Wroclaw - Katowice then four nodes and
three links are utilized with a resulting availability of
99.3%. Letting the backup path take the route Szczecin
- Kolobrzeg - Bydgoszcz - Warsaw - Lodz - Katowice
then six nodes and five links are used which results
in an availability of 98.9%. The subsequent end-to-end
availability from the working and parallel backup path
combination is 99.9236%, which is below the desired
99.999%. In the traditional survivable network design
method to meet the desired availability goa,l one could
add an additional link to the network from Szczecin to
Gdansk so that a second backup path could be pro-
vided along Szczecin - Gdansk - Bialystok-Rzeszow-
Krakow-Katowice. In contrast for the spine approach a
tree with higher available components is embedded in
the network as shown by the red links in Figure 7(b).
Assuming the components along the spine have been
selected to have availability 99.99%, then the availabil-
ity of the working path between Szczecin and Katowic
increases to 99.93% while the backup path availabil-
ity will stay the same. The resulting overall end-to-end
availability from the working and backup path com-
bination increases to 99.99923%, thereby meeting the
desired availability goal.
The higher availability of the spine, in compari-
son to the non-spine part of the network can be ac-
complished using a variety of techniques. For the spine
more expensive equipment can be utilized that is ar-
ranged and configured to provide high availability (e.g.
hot standby line card, redundant fans, redundant back-
plane, etc. ) with redundant equipment deployed locally
in parallel as needed (e.g., hot standby OXC). Also, the
equipment along the spine can be situated to increase
the mean time to failure (MTTF) using a number of
techniques such as longer back up power supplies, bet-
ter heating/cooling, stronger outside cabinets, under-
ground links instead of above ground, etc.
In a similar vein methods can be employed to re-
duce the mean time to repair (MTTR) along the spine.
For instance, one can follow best practices and training
procedures as determined by several government and
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trade organizations (e.g., NRIC, FCC, TIA) and stan-
dards bodies (e.g., ITU). The operator can pre-position
spare parts, equipment, software and test equipment
along the spine. Similarly, the network operations cen-
ter (NOC) can more closely monitor the spine portion
of the network. Furthermore, the operator can assign
the most experienced staff to the operations, adminis-
tration and management (OAM) of the spine portion
of the network. Many of the methods above are em-
ployed in other critical infrastructures (e.g., the power
grid) and industries and studies show that the average
MTTR can be reduced by 5 - 25% resulting in a signif-
icant improvement in the availability.
In general the spine based approach has the poten-
tial to provide larger differences in the availability pro-
vided to quality of resilience classes resulting in less over
engineering of the network to meet the most stringent
availability requirements. Furthermore, it can naturally
support the green networking concept by potentially
allowing one to power down some of the equipment
that is not part of spine during low load periods. Obvi-
ously, much additional work needs to be done to fully
flesh out the spine concept, including: detailed design
algorithms; comparative analysis contrasting with cur-
rent survivable design techniques; and integration with
classes of resilience in a multi-layer network design.
3.2 Cross-layer Mapping
As noted in Section 2.3, cross-layer mapping must be
both survivable and efficient. Over a series of papers we
have examined various aspects of cross-layer mapping.
In [22] an optimization model to find a cross-layer map-
ping in a two-layer network context (i.e., IP - WDM)
that is free of fault propagation due to any single lower
layer failure was given. This model was extended in
[30] to allow for traffic and survivability techniques at
both layers and numerical results showed the advan-
tages of providing survivability of two-layer traffic at
the bottom layer when sharing spare capacity among
all backup paths is allowed. In [29] sufficient conditions
for elimination of backhaul in multi-layer network cross-
layer survivable mapping were given and the model of
[22] was extended to a three-layer context. In [32] we
extended the cross-layer survivable mapping optimiza-
tion problem to maximize the overlay network avail-
ability given the physical layer link and node availabil-
ity information. It was shown that survivable mappings
of higher layer virtual links can result in much different
network availabilities even for the same cost. Lastly, the
idea of using differentiated cross-layer mapping to pro-
vide quality of resilience classes in part by topological
masking was presented in [31]. The basic concept is that
at any layer different quality of resilience classes see a
different topology. For instance, the most reliable class
(e.g., gold class) would see the entire topology and can
route working and protection paths on the full topology,
but lower resilience classes may have links, nodes, or ca-
pacity (e.g., wavelengths) hidden from them. A unified
optimization model was formulated to provide differen-
tiated cross-layer survivable mapping for a multi-layer
network with multiple quality of resilience classes.
This work plus other recent work in the literature
[19, 37, 39] can be viewed as pieces of preliminary work
towards a unified view of cross-layer survivable mapping
in support of developing quality of resilience classes that
provide availability guarantees. However, much work
needs to be done in terms of developing optimization
based model formulations that incorporate all the re-
quired features and the development of scalable solution
algorithms. Scalability is particularly important due the
large number of virtual networks that are concurrently
deployed in networks and typically the current litera-
ture focuses on designing a single or small number of
overlays.
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3.3 Risk Based Design
As noted in Section 2.3, there are large variations in the
location and rate of failures in a network and their so-
cietal impact. A possible line of research to incorporate
this variation is the systematic consideration of risk fac-
tors into the resilient network design. Risk management
has been advocated for critical infrastructure protec-
tion as the method of choice in allocating scarce/spare
resources for guarding against failure, accidents and at-
tacks [9, 10, 11, 20]. Risk analysis is widely used in
aerospace and civil engineering, IT security and eco-
nomics. In engineering fields, the term risk accounts
not only for the likelihood of failure but also for a de-
gree of damage resulting from the failure. The risk of a
failure is commonly defined as the product of the fail-
ure probability and the magnitude of damage caused by
the failure, where the damage can be measured in var-
ious dimensions (e.g., financial, reputation, human im-
pact, etc. [9]). Typically, different customers are willing
to live with different levels of risk that a service level
agreement is violated [45]. Consequently, not all need
to have the same level of resilience from physical layer
networks. Incorporation of risk factors can result in dif-
ferent resilience classes in terms of design and different
real-time restoration policies when a failure occurs.
For the design problem, the basic approach is to use
risk analysis information in formulating optimization
based survivable network design investment strategies
to reduce the network risk. The baseline design problem
considered is that given a working network and a fixed
budget, how best to allocate the budget for deploying a
survivability technique in different parts of the network
based on managing the risk. Preliminary work along
these lines was given in [41] where designing a surviv-
able single layer WDM network was studied. The design
approach consisted of two parts: a risk assessment and
a risk reduction investment strategy. Fault tree models,
which depict causal relationships among failure events
in the network were used for the risk assessment. A risk-
reduction investment strategy was used to determine
an allocation of budget for implementing a survivabil-
ity technique (e.g., link protection, path protection) in
different parts of the network to minimize the network
risk. A Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) for-
mulation and greedy-based heuristic were developed for
solving the minimum-risk design problem. Additionally,
various models with different risk-based design objec-
tives were considered, for example, minimizing the ex-
pected damage, minimizing the maximum damage, and
minimizing a measure of the variability of damage that
could occur in the network. Numerical results and anal-
ysis illustrating the different risk based designs and the
tradeoffs among the schemes were presented. This pre-
liminary work needs to be extended to include a multi-
layer network architecture and different classes of re-
silience.
3.4 Resilient Access
A potential bottleneck to providing end-to-end avail-
ability guarantees is the access network portion of an
end-to-end path. For example, connecting smart grid
synchrophasors at substations to regional network con-
trol centers. The fundamental challenge in access net-
works is lack of diversity and redundancy in the network
topology. In order to provide resilience services, access
networks must adhere to the same architectural guide-
lines as MAN and WAN networks. However, given the
economic cost limitations of the so called “last mile”,
a basic question is how much resilience can be added
at minimal cost and in an incremental risk mitigation-
based fashion. Specifically, we advocated the adoption
of the integration of risk based analysis techniques (e.g.,
fault trees, apportioned risk reduction, and ranked or-
der risk reduction) and incremental resilient network
design to access networks. Another line of research here
is setting up a mechanism such that competing access
network technologies be used to provide redundancy.
For example, utilizing a 4G cellular network as a backup
resource/path for synchrophasors at substations with a
wired connection for a primary working path.
4 Conclusions
In this paper a number of challenges to providing re-
liability in current networks were examined, namely:
cost constraints; virtualization and traffic trends; multi-
layer technology and cross-layer mapping; multiple net-
works and operators, regulatory issues and ultra high
availability traffic; variation and correlation of failure
rates; and green networking. Promising paths for future
research to solve some of the identified challenges were
examined including: providing differentiated classes of
resilience in multi-layer networks, use of a highly avail-
able spine embedded in a network to enhance availabil-
ity differentiation and support high availability traffic;
the need for cross-layer mapping algorithms that are
scalable and that provide classes of resilience; incorpo-
ration of risk into resilient network design and increas-
ing access network reliability. In conclusion, resilient
networking is an area rich in open research problems
with much work to be done.
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